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The African experience with mobile telephony has been extolled as a
defining moment in the continent’s contemporary economic, social, and
political development. Yet SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) registration
schemes are threatening to throttle the technology’s developmental
potential. These mandates, which require the registration of identity
information to activate a mobile SIM card, are fast becoming universal in
Africa, with little to no public debate about the wider social or political
effects. Whereas some authors have explored the motivations behind these
drives, as well as their potential economic impacts, this paper focuses its
critique on the broader diversity of implications of this regulatory
transformation. Viewing SIM registration through a lens that combines
surveillance studies and information & communication technologies for
development, it examines elements of resistance across a range of actors,
as well as other emerging effects like access barriers, linkages to
financialization, and Africa’s budding mobile surveillance society.
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I. Introduction: The rise of the African mobile society
In 1999, only 10 percent of the African population was covered by a mobile
signal; ten years later, that figure was 60 percent (Aker and Mbiti, 2010).
Today, of the six billion mobile subscriptions globally, approximately 695
million are in Africa (Baker, 2012), which is currently home to over a one
billion people. More than 735 million subscribers were expected in Africa by
the end of 2012 (GSMA, 2011) and it is estimated that it will have one
billion subscribers by at least 2016 (Reed, 2011). Although beginning with
basic phones and low–bandwidth connectivity, Africans increasingly have
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access to high–quality 3G networks and affordable smartphones (Minges,
2012).
In contrast to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co–operation and
Development) economies where mobile telephony exists alongside
significant fixed broadband usage, in Africa a wide variety of activities are
concentrated onto the mobile device. As these devices increasingly access
high–bandwidth networks and applications, Africa may continue to ‘leapfrog’
fixed infrastructure such as landlines and broadband, leading some to
discuss a “mobile first” (Kelly and Minges, 2012), “mobile–centric” (Donner
and Gitau, 2009), or even “mobile only” (Donner, et al., 2010) paradigm.
However, the concomitant privacy and surveillance implications of portable,
ubiquitous mobile connectivity in Africa are, at the moment, largely
overlooked. One of the key modalities of Africa’s emerging mobile–centric
surveillance society is the rise of SIM registration requirements. These
regulations require mobile phone users to provide personal identification
details in order to purchase and/or use a SIM card. They are now in effect
in the majority of African countries and have a range of implications for
inclusion, surveillance, and development.
In the sections that follow, we first embark on a theoretical discussion that
links the literature on information and communication technologies (ICTs)
and development with social studies of surveillance. Next we discuss our
methodology before documenting the rise of SIM registration policies and
the drivers of this regulatory transformation. We then detail a range of
emerging effects, with a particular focus on resistance, as well as evidence
of an unfolding barrier to mobile communications access and linkages to the
financial inclusion agenda. Finally, we discuss the wider implications of SIM
registration within the framing of African telecommunications and
surveillance.
 
II. Theoretical backdrop: Linking ICT4D & surveillance studies
In the past 20 or so years, a significant body of research and practice has
coalesced around the use of information and communication technologies
for development (ICT4D) [1]. This literature joins together a variety of
methodologies and disciplines, including from major aid institutions,
universities, civil society, and industry (see Kleine and Unwin, 2009). Early
efforts sought to bring the perceived benefits of telephony and the Internet
to low–income areas, bridging the so–called digital divide that Norris (2001)
and others documented emerging both between industrialized and
developing countries as well as within countries. This focus on inclusion —
as variably manifest (Warschauer, 2003) — has been historically pre–
eminent, motivating a range of efforts to boost access, from telecenters to
market reforms.
Over the past 10 years, considerable gains have been made following the
rapid spread of mobile connectivity, although access remains unevenly
distributed by geography, gender, and income. The reduction in barriers to
mobile connectivity is generally attributed to a number of causes, most
notably market liberalization and privatization, the availability and sharing
of low–cost handsets, and business models that lower the cost of access,
such as prepaid airtime (Castells, et al., 2007). These transformations have
yielded a large body of research on the positive relationship between
economic and social development and the growth of mobile telephony (Aker
and Mbiti, 2010). A variety of cross–national assessments suggest a
positive relationship between GDP growth and the diffusion of ICTs
(Waverman, et al., 2005; Qiang and Rossotto, 2009). On a microeconomic
level, mobile diffusion has been shown to improve market efficiency and
both producer and consumer welfare, especially in agricultural markets that
predominate in developing countries (Jensen, 2007; Muto and Yamano,
2009; Goyal, 2010). Additionally, mobile phones and services can improve
the ability of the poor to share and mitigate risks: in Kenya, the mobile
money service M–PESA of the dominant operator, Safaricom, is associated
with a marked enhancement in the ability to manage exogenous shocks
(Jack and Suri, 2011). Such innovations are improving service delivery in
sectors as diverse as healthcare, agriculture, financial services, and
governance (Kelly and Minges, 2012), and contribute to the widespread
belief in the democratic potential of ICTs (e.g., Howard, 2010).
While directly related to these concerns, this paper is also positioned within
a literature that is surprisingly rarely connected to ICT4D efforts: the social
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study of surveillance. This field, too, is concerned with the implications of
new ICTs, though unlike ICT4D, its studies are typically located in the
global North. Furthermore, where ICT4D historically seeks to understand
access barriers and how to reduce them, surveillance studies explores the
broader consequences of increased ICT access and use. Specifically, it
examines the social, political, and criminological implications of the
adoption and use of new ICTs and business models based on the collection
and processing of personal data — whether identifiable or not [2] — as well
as new policies and laws with data registration and monitoring components.
Sociologists view surveillance as a mode of categorization, social sorting
(Lyon, 2003), and discrimination (Gandy, 2009): it facilitates the
observation and tracking of people and objects, their labeling and
subsequent organization, and the value judgments based on these
orderings. Studies of surveillance are concerned with how these practices
facilitate the control of populations and how surveillance affects people’s life
chances and choices. They also seek to reveal the logics, operations, and
consequences of the underlying systems, and the attendant ethics. Scholars
also explore how information societies over time become surveillance
societies and the unintended but nevertheless harmful outcomes of these
transformations. Scholars of surveillance are thus generally critical of the
phenomenon, especially its modern forms that more and more rely on ICTs
and opaque algorithms (Graham and Wood, 2003) to process people,
bodies, and data at scale and in real–time. However, others stress the
potentially beneficial and emancipatory aspects of surveillance, especially in
contexts in which careful consideration has been paid to ethical concerns,
social values, and the complex interplay between the surveillance mission
and its stated objectives (e.g., Murakami Wood and Firmino, 2009).
Theoretical treatments of surveillance tend to debate the most appropriate
metaphors and models to describe phenomena. Despite their popular
appeal, few surveillance scholars today consider George Orwell’s Big
Brother or Michel Foucault’s panopticon as realistic models for
contemporary surveillance. In 1990, Mark Poster described the “super–
panopticon” in terms of a “system of surveillance without walls, windows,
towers, or guards” [3]. A decade later, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) argued
that “we can now speak of an emerging ‘surveillant assemblage’” — a
heterogeneous network that abstracts humans into distinct ‘data doubles’ to
“be scrutinized and targeted for intervention.” Their formulation is the
leading theoretical conceptualization of surveillance today and is one to
which we will turn in the discussion.
 
III. Methodology
This paper focuses on a major — though largely unremarked upon — shift
in the regulatory structure of African telecommunications that requires
prepaid mobile users to register personal identification information with the
government, usually with a network service provider as an intermediary.
These SIM registration requirements are now in effect in nearly all African
countries, but scholarly assessment is almost completely absent. What
analysis does exist is scattered through media, civil society, and industry
sources. To begin filling this lacuna, this paper collects the results of
research conducted in 2012–2013. Building on the previous work of
Jentzsch (2012), in October 2012 we completed an exhaustive survey of
the status of SIM registration requirements in African countries. This was
subsequently revisited and updated in August 2013. During this work, we
also extensively reviewed the public record on SIM registration, primarily
relying on media and civil society reports. This was complemented by a
series of conversations with experts in civil society and intergovernmental
organizations, including representatives of the GSM Association,
MobileActive, World Bank, African Development Bank Group, United
National Development Programme, OECD Secretariat, the Media Institute of
Southern Africa, and Research ICT Africa [4].
 
IV. Mobile communications surveillance on the African continent:
The case of SIM registration
The widespread diffusion of mobile connectivity across Africa has been
accompanied by the generally unremarked and underappreciated adoption
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of policies, processes, and practices for mobile communications
surveillance. These developments include government policies for mobile
data retention by telecommunications service providers (in which these
companies store call detail records on behalf of the police and security
agencies for a specific period of time) (cf., Whitley and Hosein, 2005), law
enforcement use of specialized surveillance equipment such as IMSI
catchers [5] to eavesdrop on communications and to track the location of
mobile devices, and policies for the government registration of SIM cards
with personal information such as name, national identification number,
address, photograph, fingerprints, and so forth. For unregistered SIM card
users the standard penalty is network disconnection. What is particularly
interesting about SIM registration as compared to other forms of
communications surveillance is that registration requires the active
participation of the user, with direct consequences (i.e., loss of access) for
failing to comply.
Of the 55 countries in Africa, as of February 2014 at least 49 require or are
in the process of requiring the registration of personally identifiable data in
order to activate a prepaid SIM card (see Figure 1) [6]. In many cases,
these laws require substantial penalties including fines and imprisonment.
This is a notable change from just a few years ago. Prior to 2006, none of
the countries in Africa had such a policy in place — across the continent one
was able to purchase a prepaid card and use it more or less anonymously.
In contrast to wealthier markets, African mobile telephony is
overwhelmingly prepaid (Kelly and Minges, 2012), a structure that enabled
access for populations without credit records, fixed addresses, or reliable
income, but which has also resulted in much greater anonymity for users.
The GSM Association (2013b) recently estimated that 95 percent of African
SIM cards are prepaid. The growth of SIM registration mandates might be
understood as a general reaction to this. More specifically, there are a few
apparent reasons for this sudden adoption of SIM registration policies.
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Figure 1: SIM registration in Africa — Red denotes countries where registration is     
do not require SIM registration as of February 2014 
 
The first is security. As Jentzsch [8] notes, in East Africa, for example, the
East African Communications Organization (EACO) has been a major
proponent of SIM registration, encouraging national governments in the
region to adopt relevant laws and regulations or to support voluntary
initiatives. Governments and regional organizations like the EACO are
ostensibly motivated by the belief that forcing customers to register SIM
cards will reduce the opportunities for malevolent actors to use mobile
devices anonymously to undertake unlawful or socially harmful activities,
including kidnapping, drug trafficking, and terrorism. The underlying
concern is that, in markets in which SIM cards need not be registered with
personally identifiable information, users have the opportunity to
communicate without attribution and are thus outside the immediate reach
of the police. In countries like Kenya (Crandall, 2013) and Tanzania
(Mwachang’a, 2013), the motivation has been explicitly linked to worries
about inflammatory ‘hate speech’ being spread via SMS. In light of the
September 2013 attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi, the government
has significantly increased its pressure, including criminal liability for MNO
executives in the event of unregistered SIM cards on their network (Kamau,
2013).
The evidence for this justification, however, is weak. As Jentzsch notes,
“there are essentially no robust empirical studies that show that such
measures make a difference in terms of crime detection as criminals have a
number of ways of circumventing rules” [9]. Where the effectiveness of SIM
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registration has been studied and subject to consultation, it has often been
found to be wanting. A survey of OECD member countries found little
reason to believe criminals would be affected, Canada’s privacy
commissioner repudiated the idea after investigation, and it was rejected
after consultations in the Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands,
and Poland (Hemeson, 2012).
Even if anonymous SIMs are difficult to obtain, as Izougu (2010) notes,
criminals are likely to adopt one of three tactics: illicit cloning of third–party
SIMs, using foreign SIMs on roaming mode, or the adoption of Internet and
satellite telephony. Anecdotes, often relayed by the regulators who promote
the registration policies, suggest the registration of SIM cards has proven
helpful in some successful police investigations; yet, in other cases, the
implementation has been so problematic that investigators do not trust the
system (Smillie, 2012). In Africa, there are further reasons to doubt the
effectiveness of SIM registration for accurately apprehending criminals. The
policies assume that SIM cards are reducible to one user, but to overcome
material constraints, shared usage is common on the continent (Burrell,
2010). Further upsetting this assumption that registration data will
accurately reflect the future user of a SIM card is the fact that, in some
cases, the difficulty of registration has induced the government to allow
proxies to register SIM cards (Adaramola, 2011b). As has been noted from
Tanzania to Ghana and Nigeria, the on–the–ground implementation is often
weak, meaning loopholes and exceptions abound, as well. Still, security
continues to dominate political debate in most African states on the need
for these identification measures.
Other stated reasons for the growth of SIM registration are economic and
regulatory. The International Telecommunication Union in 2007
recommended SIM registration to improve statistical accuracy on the mobile
market as well as to reduce access to grey market phones (TeleGeography,
2013). Mobile operators stand to benefit from government–mandated
policies, even if there may be upfront costs associated with registering
users. The introduction of SIM registration rules may increase switching
costs and thereby reduce ‘churn’, the industry term for customer migration
to competitors [10]. This is because registration requirements are often
burdensome and force customers to take time to visit registration centers
to provide documentation and submit their personal information. It may
impact on the common practice of swapping SIMs to benefit from cheaper
in–network rates, as customers may be unwilling to register several SIMs
with different network providers. Similarly, it is likely that SIM registration
will impede the popular practice of “plastic roaming”, meaning the purchase
of a local SIM when traveling internationally [11]. Providers may also use
registration data to market new services and products to customers
(Sunday, 2011), given that it enables “operators to have a predictable
profile about the users of their network” [12].
On the other hand, in some cases SIM registration has been supported by
advocates of number portability. This could contradict the churn–reduction
argument. Depending on how the system is implemented, SIM registration
could empower customers to port their mobile phone numbers to other
service providers as it would be easier to authenticate the customer who is
requesting the transfer. Identity information would likely need to be shared
between service providers, potentially through a government intermediary.
In Nigeria, for example, the Communications Commission has stated that
registration is a prerequisite for number portability.
Given the lack of evidence about the efficacy of SIM registration either for
security or commerce, the spread of the phenomena suggests elements of
what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call “institutional isomorphism”. Instead
of organizational homogenization occurring due to the demands of, say,
market competition, many models and behaviors spread and are copied due
to ambiguity: “when the environment creates ... uncertainty, organizations
may model themselves on other organizations.” In the case of SIM
registration, although states have little evidence of the advantages,
transformations wrought by the growth of largely anonymous mobile
communication create a situation of unpredictability where imitation and
mimicry is likely to occur. Indeed, the head of Rwanda’s Utilities Regulatory
Authority has explicitly pointed to the international normalization of SIM
registration as justification for his effort (see Kanyesigye, 2013a).
Furthermore, because few stakeholders have challenged these policy
proposals, governments have not needed to supply evidence in their favor.
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V. Emerging effects
The earliest African SIM registration laws were introduced in 2006 and most
have only gone into effect in the past couple years (Jentzsch, 2012), yet a
number of emerging trends are evident and are likely to grow in the coming
years. In this section, we point to three in particular. First, we document
the variety of forms of resistance to SIM registration laws. Entities ranging
from corporations to churches to everyday citizens have mobilized a variety
of arguments and tactics against SIM registration, but to little formal avail.
Second, we discuss the evidence that SIM registration requirements erect a
barrier to mobile communications, thereby threatening the inclusiveness of
African mobile connectivity. Finally, we explore the complex relationship
between SIM registration and financial inclusion, especially in light of the
adoption of mobile money services across the continent.
A) Challenges & resistance
Few African states face a strong countervailing power. There are multiple
reasons for this, but in general limited democratization, poverty, and
dispersed, rural populations have curbed the emergence of disputes in civil
society. However, that is not to say that resistance is nonexistent. SIM
registration policies have faced resistance in Africa, but without overturning
or radically altering them, as we document below.
Scholars of surveillance have variously explored the subjectivities of
resistance to surveillance (Foucault, 1979), the sometimes ad hoc and
everyday character of resistance tactics (Gilliom, 2001), and technologies
and techniques for opposing surveillance (Mann, et al., 2003). Of particular
interest is Gilliom’s research, which depicts a “widespread pattern of
complaint, evasion and resistance” to welfare surveillance in poor regions of
the U.S. [13]. By his account, even seemingly powerless actors can
undermine a surveillance mission, often without intending to resist
surveillance per se. Importantly, he moves away from the dichotomies that
define much of the literature (i.e., the resistance relationships between
watchers and the watched) to distinguish resistors other than the subjects
of surveillance.
Following Martin, et al. (2009), who expand on this multi–actor framework
for exploring forms of resistance to surveillance, we understand resistance
as a multiple concept incorporating varying notions of action, interaction,
opposition, awareness, and power. Resistance may be organized or not; it
may be overt or covert. It can be an individual, collective, or institutional
effort. Resistance is usually intentional but it can also be unintentional; that
is, some acts of resistance may be unintended as resistance by the actor
but nonetheless considered as such by an authority (this is what Hollander
and Einwohner (2004) call “unwitting” resistance). To illustrate, the
purchase of a SIM card registered under a false name may not be intended
as an act of resistance by the buyer (who is simply motivated by convenient
mobile access) but regulatory agencies may interpret these actions as
resistant. In some cases, everyday resistance will be understood and meant
as resistance by parties; in others, it will be an apolitical tactic to route
around heavy–handed uniform laws that cannot capture the diversity of the
world and thus require informal practices. In this sense, resistance is very
often in the eye of the beholder.
Commercial resistance
Mobile network operators (MNOs) who fear losing customers and assuming
the costs of registration have resisted SIM registration policies. For
example, the South African legislation that, among other provisions
required SIM registration, made operators responsible for the cost of
compliance, an obligation that was “vigorously opposed” during
consultations (Bawa, 2006). The CEO of Vodacom, Alan Knott–Craig,
argued that SIM registration would “wreak havoc on SA’s poor” because
“millions of South Africans simply do not have the information RICA
[Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication Related Information Act] requires” (Knott–Craig, 2006).
While operators argued that public safety is the responsibility of the state
(that their existing tax dollars support), the government was of the position
that the operators “are in possession of a very productive and lucrative
resource and that it is therefore appropriate in the circumstances that they
should bear particular obligations in respect of the implementation” (Bawa,
2006). In all, the top three operators reported spending around US$120
million to authenticate subscribers (Pressly, 2011), a price that was likely
passed onto consumers (Bawa, 2006). In 2013, as a similar process
occurred in Nigeria, some operators clashed with the government over the
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looming deadline, even threatening not to terminate unregistered SIM cards
as the law requires (Anonymous, 2013).
Another form of commercial resistance is embodied by the illicit sale of SIM
cards that are pre–registered with the identifying information of someone
other than the actual buyer. In Nigeria, for example, vendors are known to
sell cards with fictitious names in order to facilitate quick and easy
transactions, as customers do not have to wait for a SIM to be registered
before using it. Recent reports show that some of these vendors have been
arrested for contravening the country’s SIM registration directive. And it is
not just street vendors who are being punished. In June 2011, Globacom (a
large Nigerian mobile operator) was sanctioned for selling pre–activated
SIM cards (Akanbi, 2012). Regarding the operators’ culpability in the sale of
falsely registered SIM cards, a representative from the Nigerian
Communications Commission (NCC), the national regulator, has been
quoted as stating, “the vendors arrested will lead us to the dealers, and the
dealers are bound to lead us to the operators that give them support. We
will surely catch up with them” (Akanbi, 2012). In rhetoric reminiscent of
the “War on Drugs”, this crackdown has even been described as an effort
“to rid the streets of pre–registered SIM cards” (Fripp, 2012a) [14].
Elsewhere, in Uganda unregistered SIMs have reportedly remained
connected despite the deadline for registration passing (Kagolo, 2014).
Although operators have been perhaps the most vocal opponents, some
industry actors are starting to shift to various degrees of support for SIM
registration. In part, this is because governments have proven unwilling to
reconsider the trend (apart from issues on the margin such as the timeline
for implementation — deadline extensions are a commonplace). Others,
such as the President of the Association of Telecommunications Companies
of Nigeria, Dr. Emmanuel Ekuwem, share the government’s security
concerns (Oruame, n.d.). But a more durable trend, discussed further
below, is the increasing awareness that SIM registration may prove
profitable, by allowing MNOs to better target services to, and sell data
about, personally identifiable customers (see Levisse, et al., 2008). In mid–
2012, MTN Nigeria announced a “hard line”; in favor of SIM registration
explicitly referencing their ability to better target customers (Fripp, 2012b).
In Kenya, the operators are reportedly using SIM registration as a means to
“gain useful insight on prepaid customers [and] develop a more targeted
approach to segments of our consumers and entice them to pick post–paid
services” (Sunday, 2011). Following SIM registration, Vodacom South Africa
was able to increase “implementations of direct prepaid campaigns resulting
in significant prepaid churn reduction from 48.1% at Q3 2008 to 38.1% at
Q3 2009” (Scanlon, 2010). There is thus a complex organizational dynamic
to this commercial resistance whereby different actors within the mobile
telephony business are involved in challenging official policy while others
are supportive. These seemingly contradictory stances — opposition and
opportunism — point to both the internal plurality of the
telecommunications industry, as well as the inherently ambiguous nature of
surveillance (on the latter, see Lyon, 2007).
Political opposition
As suggested above, in contrast to OECD economies, there is limited civil
society or political advocacy around the topics of privacy and surveillance in
Africa. This has also been the case with SIM registration, though in a few
instances the political implications of this form of growing surveillance have
motivated resistance. In Uganda, the leader of the opposition Democratic
Party has argued that SIM registration is not effective at curbing crime but
did provide an unwarranted increase in the monitoring capacity of the
government (Anonymous, 2012a). Additionally, the Human Rights Network
for Journalists in Uganda has spoken out against the process and even
sued, claiming that disconnecting mobile phones violates “fundamental
human rights like freedom of expression, right to privacy and access to
information.” (Anite, 2013; Agaba, 2012; HRNJU, 2013). In Botswana,
some within the media condemned the SIM registration mandate as an
effort to put journalists under surveillance (Oruame, n.d.). In Zambia, local
chiefs have called for an extension of the registration deadline and the
former vice–president and current opposition figure Godfrey Miyanda has
spoken against “the abrogation of some citizens’ liberties”, calling for the
requirement to be dropped (Adamu, 2013).
Consumer advocacy
On a related track, some actors have resisted SIM registration as an
unwarranted imposition on consumer rights. MNO opposition has often
taken this tact, but so have independent organizations. In Ghana, a think
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tank and independent lawyers challenged the government’s right to
disconnect unregistered mobile subscribers on the grounds that it violated a
valid contract between the users and the MNOs. Furthermore, because the
state failed to provide the necessary identity documents to many customers
who would be disconnected through the enforcement of SIM registration
rules, they advocated that the requirement was a capricious and
irresponsible use of government force (Dowuona, 2011). In Nigeria,
consumers have complained about SIM registration, in this case because
they were being charged to do so, apparently illicitly by agents, leading the
MNOs to struggle to curtail the practice (Adaramola, 2011a).
Religious opposition
Perhaps surprisingly, another source of resistance has been from religious
communities [15]. Throughout Africa, evangelical churches have grown to
be a major social and cultural phenomenon, and one that has increasing
political implications (see Ranger, 2008). In Zambia, members of the
Greater Destiny Pentecostal Church have dissented, linking SIM registration
to apocryphal warnings in the Bible’s Book of Revelation about the “mark of
the beast” (Anonymous, 2012b). Anthropologist Charles Piot (2012) reports
similar resistance and “deep suspicions” in Lomé, Togo during the summer
of 2012.
Everyday resistance
The most widespread resistance to SIM registration, though, has taken the
form of illicit access to pre–registered SIM cards. As with other illegal
activities, it is difficult to ascertain the prevalence of this practice, but
according to reports and the experiences of the authors, obtaining a SIM
card without undergoing proper registration is both easy and common. In
South Africa, following the imposition of mandatory registration in mid–
2011, SIM cards have been readily available for US$2 or US$3 in major
cities. Individuals may register up to 100 SIM cards, so peers often register
for each other (especially in the case of illegal immigrants who would
otherwise be cut off from mobile communication (Nyathi, 2011)). In one
case, an individual was found in possession of 60,000 SIM cards “all
registered to one untraceable person”, suggesting the involvement of MNO
insiders and criminal syndicates (Nair, 2011). Although SIM registration
data has been used in some criminal cases, other investigators and police
officials feel that the registration fraud is common enough to undermine
confidence in using any of the data for investigations (Smillie, 2012). Media
reports from across Africa are peppered with stories of the ease with which
pre–registered cards can be purchased. It is likely often the result of
activities such as those uncovered in Nigeria, where telecommunications
managers were discovered making pre–registered SIM cards on machines
seized in a raid (Onyekamuo, 2013). In addition to knowingly resisting the
law, there have been examples of Hollander and Einwohner’s (2004)
‘unwitting’ resistance. Commenting on the “illegal” sale of pre–registered
SIM cards, the NCC’s Director of Public Affairs has stated that, “some
people are doing it out of ignorance but that won’t stop us from prosecuting
those caught violating the law” (Akanbi, 2012), thus implying that
resistance can be “ignorant” — that is, unwitting but still punishable.
Material resistance
Key challenges have also emerged from the very materiality of
implementing SIM registration. The creation of an information infrastructure
requires interaction between manifold sources of data: in this case, identity
documents, registration forms, SIM cards, computer databases and more.
This results in what Edwards (2010) calls “data friction”, the inevitable
conflicts and unruliness of working with data. A similar dynamic is present
in building a surveillance infrastructure like SIM registration.
In Zambia (Awad, 2013) and South Sudan (Nashion, 2013) the registrars
ran out of the necessary paperwork. Elsewhere, poor transportation
infrastructure has hampered efforts (Lusaka Voice, 2013). In Uganda,
manual data entry slowed progress (Waiswa, 2013).
A key challenge to the registration of mobile users in Africa is the lack of
reliable identification documents. This is a form of material resistance that
especially manifests given the sheer scale of the registration requirements
[16]. In most countries, the foundational civil registration of vital statistics
(such as birth and death records) is undeveloped, meaning many people
live “without leaving a trace in any legal record or official statistics” (Setel,
et al., 2007; see also Breckenridge and Szreter, 2012). Even in situations
where population registries are established, tens of millions of Africans lack
the documentation that links them to their “data double” (Haggerty and
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Ericson, 2000), thus limiting their ability to reliably prove their identity. In
the case of South Africa, among the most well–established and capable
African states (Goldblatt, et al., 2008), this situation has persisted despite a
legacy of mandatory identification documents — apartheid’s infamous
‘passbooks’ — and a significant post–apartheid effort to improve and unify
civil identification (Breckenridge, 2005). A recent Gallup survey in Kenya on
barriers to voting found that lack of documentation was a significant barrier
(Tortora and Rheault, 2012). In Ghana, where identity documents are often
handwritten, mobile telecommunications service providers have blamed the
country’s weak national identification infrastructure for the failing national
initiative to register SIM cards (Dowuona, 2012). Likewise, in Uganda the
lack of a national identity system is one of the official reasons for declining
SIM registration rates (Nantaba, 2012; see also Kalungi, 2013).
The situation is aggravated for the elderly and infirm, and by the high
proportion of Africans who live in sparsely populated rural areas. Not only
are these populations less likely to have access to the government offices
where they could acquire identification documents, they are less likely to
know about or be able to travel for SIM registration. The costs of long
distance travel are an additional factor complicating SIM registration for
those living in remote areas. Minors, too, often lack the requisite
documentation, leading one Rwandan observer to note that “minors who
own phones without their parents’ or guardians’ consent will effectively be
disconnected” (Kanyesigye, 2013b). Even when citizens are able to access
and negotiate government bureaucracies, the cost of providing a
photograph or photocopies for registration can prove exclusionary [17].
B) Barrier to mobile diffusion
The diffusion of mobile phones in Africa has been widely lauded for its
developmental role, oftentimes providing a transformative form of
communication. This widespread diffusion has been enabled by a significant
reduction in the barriers to entry for customers, such as through business
models like prepaid mobile telephony. Where many governments have
previously taken significant steps to support universal mobile access (e.g.,
through industry subsidies and tax allowances), SIM registration represents
a shift toward erecting barriers to access, especially for poor and
marginalized populations. As the Head of Regulatory Affairs for Africa at
Millicom International Cellular noted, “These requirements present real
‘access’ difficulties for the most economically vulnerable individuals”
(Kamara, 2013).
In addition to the evidence presented above that many Africans lack the
necessary documents for SIM registration, Jenztsch (2012) has recently
provided an economic model that demonstrates the likely slowdown in
mobile penetration growth. The thesis is borne out by data from countries
that have implemented mandatory SIM registration measures, leading one
industry insider to say that “all SIM cards registration exercises in African
countries have translated into a temporary decrease in the number of
mobile subscribers” (Southwood, 2011). In Zimbabwe, the two leading
operators lost more than two million subscribers from a previous total of
4.4 million, dropping mobile penetration 14 percent, to 53.5 percent of
Zimbabweans (Southwood, 2011). In South Africa, MTN’s subscriber base
fell from 17.2 to 16.4 million following SIM registration, and the policy was
“expected to slow down subscriber acquisition by operators as the vast
majority of the population either does not have formal identification or
proof of address” (Esselaar, et al., 2010). MTN’s competitor Cell C also
reported a 70 percent drop in gross activations as a result (de Koker,
2010). In November 2013, Niger deactivated a third of its mobile phone
connections due to lack of registration (AFP, 2013). In Uganda, where a
registration exercise was scheduled to end in August 2013, MNOs have
expressed concerns about losing customers as it is common for people to
use multiple SIM cards to take advantage of cheaper in–network calls, but
for whom registering several SIM cards with different operators will be a
burden (Kulabako, 2012). The founding assumption of registering a SIM
card to one person does not reflect the dynamic of shared access which
characterizes African mobile use (Burrell, 2010) [18]. Mobile subscriber
figures are notoriously difficult to count accurately (Sutherland, 2009), so
while some of the reductions can be expected as the result of removing
unused accounts, in other cases, the increased barriers — especially for
those without identity documents — likely serve to reduce access to low–
cost mobile communication [19].
In practice, this exclusionary aspect is probably unevenly distributed with
regard to socio–economic status, with those already marginalized to be
most affected [20]. For example, in South Africa, de Koker [21] noted that
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SIM registration would disproportionality impact undocumented migrants,
asylum seekers, and even documented refugees (whose documentation
may not suffice). As one Zimbabwean MNO noted, its customers traveling
to South Africa are being forced to rely on roaming “as non–residents are
finding it difficult to get SIM cards” (Analysys Mason, 2010). Many South
African citizens, too, struggle to obtain official documentation, and as of
February 2010, more than 500,000 identity documents were unclaimed
from government offices. For many criminals that SIM registration
mandates seek to impede, it is unlikely that access to fraudulent identity
documents is a problem. Overcoming such unintended discriminatory
aspects of SIM registration would require a significant investment in
outreach that is largely missing (spare isolated cases like Rwanda’s “door–
to–door” registration drive (Kwihangana, 2013)); instead, the
overwhelming logic is one of responsibilization, where citizens are held
accountable for meeting the goals of the state. Even worse, key coping
strategies of the poor — such as using multiple SIM cards — are being
villainized (e.g., Nigeria Communications Week, 2013).
C) Linkages to the financial inclusion agenda
The rise of mobile identification in Africa is quickly being linked to another
influential trend: the financial inclusion agenda, though perhaps in
contradictory ways. Development institutions, philanthropic organizations,
governments, and industry have joined together in an effort to increase
access for poor people to financial services, pointing to evidence of various
developmental benefits (Schwittay, 2011). In the past five years, MNOs
have joined the movement in significant numbers, spurred by the success
of M–PESA (see Maurer, 2012; Donovan, 2012). Without discounting the
charitable impulse present in much of the mobile financial inclusion agenda,
for network operators, the appeal is largely commercial: as competition
increases and customer acquisition slows, operators see mobile money as
an important emerging revenue stream. For example, Airtel has recently
announced a partnership with Sanlam, a South African insurance firm, to
sell policies in seven African countries, and Safaricom has partnered with
banks to offer micro–loans, insurance, and savings to the more than 15
million users of M–PESA (Munshi, 2012).
As with other financial services, guidelines from the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) for mobile money endorse customer due diligence rules for the
purposes of anti–money laundering and combating the financing of
terrorism (AML/CFT). These rules, commonly referred to as Know Your
Customer (KYC) regulations, push mobile money providers to collect
identity information from their customers, however the limited identification
documentation readily available to the poor has traditionally been one of
the key barriers to accessing formal financial services. Modifications to the
FATF guidelines that allowed so–called ‘tiered’ or ‘proportionate’ KYC rules
are considered a key reason services like M–PESA were able to succeed
(see Isern and de Koker, 2009). Such standards require less personal
information and are considered more appropriate for the low–risk activities
of mobile money users. A number of proponents of SIM registration have
argued that such a practice will benefit financial inclusion by universalizing
the type of KYC data needed for mobile money; for example, a
representative of the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority “said
that [the] SIM card registration exercise is for the benefit of customers
especially for services like electronic money transfers, the settling of bills
and other monetary transactions” (Mhagama, 2013). The reality, though, is
more complicated. As de Koker (2010) discusses for South Africa, the
information required for SIM registration and KYC differ, and it is unclear
how well they can be aligned. In cases where SIM registration is excluding
the poor from mobile services, it may even undermine financial inclusion
goals (see also de Koker and Jentzsch, 2013; de Koker, 2011).
In other cases, including those where the KYC and SIM registration efforts
align, the identification of mobile users could increase the use of formal
financial services. Importantly, the success of new mobile financial services
is believed to hinge on new forms of data collection and analysis. The vast
majority of Africans lacks a formal credit history, meaning that potential
lenders are unable to model and manage risk. The canonical microfinance
model used group lending and joint liability in part because it overcame this
lack of credit records, relying on existing trust and social capital to ensure
repayment (Roodman, 2011). As microfinance evolves towards more
individualized and commercial models, including new products such as
insurance, “more mainstream financial tools such as credit bureaus and
credit scoring are already starting to be used” (Schwittay, 2011; see also
Schreiner, 2009; Campion and Valenzuela, 2002). As a recent industry
report detailed, “there is an opportunity for lenders to chart another path,
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using increased computing power and new sources of information and data
(including mobile phone usage patterns, utility bill payment history, and
others) to build better risk models” (Baer, et al., 2012). While in some
cases this data will be population–level, in many it will be tied directly to
individual identity, often through the use of SIM card registration data. For
example, one Asian consumer lender “found that delinquencies on mobile
phone bills were 60 percent more predictive of eventual small–loan defaults
than were delinquencies on loans from other banks. Even the choice of
payment plan for the phone bill, a seemingly unimportant variable, was
found to be just as predictive as the second–best variable available from
the credit bureau” (Baer, et al., 2012).
Although it is too early to tell the result of this, there are a number of
causes for concern. As Gates (2010) points out in the U.S. context,
conceptualizing identity as a “disembodied aggregate of transaction–
generated data ... with financial data (and the security of that data) at its
core, is a fundamental aspect of the reorganization of the U.S. economy
around the priorities of financialization”. There is reason to believe that the
confluence of SIM registration (which makes transaction data personally
identifiable) and financial inclusion (which advocates financial services for
the poor) could come, as has been the case in the U.S., to “serve the
finance industry’s need to define, measure, and differentiate the population
in terms of its financial capacities” — so–called redlining. While this may be
desirable in some cases, as Roy (2010), Manji (2010), and Bateman (2010)
document, and recent microfinance industry crises in India and elsewhere
attest to, there is also a darker, more worrying side to financial inclusion.
As calls and support for “cashless” economies gather steam in Africa, the
inevitable result will be everyday financial records that are auditable and
traceable, and, doubtless, incentives to commodify personal information.
Combined with the communications and location data of mobile phones, this
is an unprecedented development. A recent United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2012) report notes that in East Africa
there is not legislation “that clearly defines who can get access to a mobile
money trail, and how, when or under what conditions such access may be
obtained” (see also Harris, et al., 2013). In the African context, where
limited consumer or privacy protections exist, the trend deserves critical
engagement [22].
 
VI. Discussion: African mobile surveillance societies
Justifying his support of SIM card registration requirements, the executive
secretary of the East African Communications Organisation noted that “Our
telephones have become a part of our identity.” This view of the centrality
of mobiles to the daily lives of users is reflected in the social studies of
mobile communications and is an important reminder of the seriousness of
probing regulatory transformations such as SIM registration.
Given their relative importance in Africa (Kelly and Minges, 2012; Castells,
et al., 2007; Donner, et al., 2010), it is perhaps not surprising that states
would seek to monitor mobile communications. Yet, in considering SIM
registration and resistance, it is crucial to consider it as a component of a
growing surveillant assemblage that also incorporates other technologies
such as biometric identity cards and electronic passport systems, new video
surveillance technologies, and, especially important in the African context,
electronic health systems. While doing justice to the breadth and
complexity of these developments is beyond the scope of this paper, this
closing discussion contends that African SIM registration requirements are
part of a growing trend on the continent toward government monitoring and
control of the communications infrastructures.
To emphasize the diversity of the phenomena that parallel — and
sometimes explicitly intersect with — SIM registration, consider a few
cases. In mid–2013, Benin became the site of a scandal around allegations
of wiretapping. As Frowd (2013) summarized, the local affiliate of South
African mobile operator MTN was accused of permitting the president of
Benin to wiretap his political rivals from the isolation of his office and home.
A few months prior, researchers at the University of Toronto revealed the
presence of command and control servers for an offensive digital intrusion
software called FinSpy in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa (Marquis–
Boire, et al., 2013). This software, provided by British firm Gamma
International, has been used from Malaysia to Bahrain to infiltrate
opposition communications [23]. In each case, a population registry from
SIM cards would significantly lower the barriers to identifying
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communications.
In Kenya, the government has established the so–called Integrated
Population Registration System (IPRS) which merges “data from the birth
and death register, citizenship register, ID card register, aliens register,
passport register and the marriage and divorce register ... On top of these
6 registers, it compiles details from the elections register, tax register,
drivers register, National Social Security Fund (NSSF) register, National
Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) register and the Kenya National Bureau of
Statistics (KNBS) register.” As Mbote (2013) reports, the “SIM registration
exercise would not have been possible without the IPRS.” The amount of
information in the IPRS led its chief to brag that, “We now have the 360
degree view of any citizen above the age of 18 years.”
Countries have also taken to monitoring and filtering mobile
communications content. SIM registration in Zimbabwe is being pursued at
least in part as a means to clamp down on political speech (e.g.,
ZimDiaspora, 2013). Zambia is using deep packet inspection (see Bendrath
and Mueller, 2011) to block opposition media (Tor Project, 2013). An effort
by the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority to capture
communications metadata (and potentially content) was rejected by a court
in September 2012 (Gondwe, 2012). In Kenya during the lead up to the
2013 elections, MNOs were algorithmically blocking up to 300,000 SMS per
day (Mukinda, 2013).
In an increasing number of African countries, these practices are being
outsourced internationally. Uganda has inked a deal with the Korean
Internet and Security Agency to help manage its domestic Internet
(Businge, 2013). Zambia, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe have sought Chinese
assistance in monitoring domestic communications and the Chinese
telecommunications giant Huawei has moved from simply providing
infrastructure to actively managing communications networks in Africa
(Reed, 2013). Pierskalla and Hollenbach [24] suggest that the capacity for
mobile surveillance in Africa is low, however these dynamics suggest that
even if that is the case, it is rapidly changing. Finally, Nigeria is currently in
the process of awarding 25 contracts for mobile phone surveillance projects
(Akwaja, 2013) despite concerns about the lack of judicial oversight,
legislative buy–in, and rogue access to collected data (Collins, 2013).
Although surveillance is constitutive of modernity (Lyon, 2007) and
sometimes even desirable, the manner in which SIM registration mandates
and these related developments have been implemented is troublesome. In
brief, they have been pursued without appropriate consultation,
transparency, or ameliorative reforms such as fair information or privacy
laws. In fact, in cases from Kenya and Tanzania to Nigeria, the very legal
basis for the action is in question. Mobile communications surveillance has
been tied to other pernicious problems, particularly corruption due to both
the secrecy and substantial government contracts involved. Nigeria
provided a US$40 million sole source contract to an Israeli firm for
monitoring communications (Emmanuel, 2013) and a recent Kenyan tender
for surveillance equipment was cancelled amid improprieties (Wabala,
2013).
This is exacerbated by the low level of democratic development in Africa.
According to Freedom House (2012), only 10 countries qualify as free, and
one of those — Mali — was the site of a recent coup. Whitehouse (2012)
notes that, “the number of electoral democracies on the continent has fallen
from 24 to 19 in the last seven years.” Indeed, non–democratic African
countries have proved quite adept at subverting any potential liberatory
effects of ICT (cf., Diamond and Plattner, 2012). Ethiopia has maintained a
government monopoly on telecommunications and invested significantly in
controlled networks (Gagliardone, 2009); Swaziland’s absolute monarch is a
large shareholder in the monopoly mobile operator MTN, which also has his
daughter on the board of directors (Lukhele, 2012) and has been accused
of shutting down its network to impede political protests (Langeni, 2011).
More broadly, mobile communications are a far more controlled
infrastructure than the Internet (Benkler, 2010; Zuckerman, 2010). The
addition of SIM registration requirements serves to lower the barrier to
surveillance. The resulting chilling effects arise just as many are hoping that
mobiles can be used to promote democracy on the continent.
As of 1999, no country in Africa had data privacy legislation (Banisar,
1999). In the intervening years, around 10 have enacted some form of data
privacy law, and a number of others have such rules pending, but
implementation and enforcement capacity remains limited (Makulilo, 2012).
In particular, few African countries have corresponding legal duties on the
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collectors of personally identifiable information, such as not to make
unauthorized disclosures. The secondary use of personally identifiable data
is sure to grow, consolidating and linking to other emerging databases.
Importantly, this is happening across borders, with the East African
Community taking steps to share SIM registration across borders (Sato,
2013). Already, the CTO of MTN Nigeria is publicly advocating for SIM
registration data to link to banking, health, and driving license data (Atili,
2012). It may be the case that normatively desirable outcomes emerge
from these happenings — indeed, we agree that the exclusion of the poor
from identity systems is often problematic (Setel, et al., 2007) — but the
growing chorus of support for the positive aspects must be complemented
by steps to avoid the downsides; in the case of SIM card registration in
Africa, this has rarely happened. As suggested earlier in this paper (section
II), the exclusion of surveillance from the dominant literature on the impact
of mobiles in Africa is at least partly responsible for this silence and
inattention.
There is an urgent need for enhanced scholarly and activist attention to SIM
registration and associated trends that are establishing surveillance at the
heart of the African mobile society. Too often, privacy is conceived as a
technical problem to be fixed — an afterthought — rather than a complex
political problem. Already the World Bank is thinking about “using digital
identity to fight poverty” (Sudan, 2013) and the United Nations is
pioneering “big data for development” (United Nations Global Pulse, 2012).
More attention must be directed towards the privacy implications and
politics of these trends. This attention can draw on international experience,
but must be deeply aware of the particularities of the African context. For
example, there is scope for learning from European data protection work,
restrictions on secondary use, and fair information laws [25]. Already SIM
registration data is being used for inappropriate ends such as electioneering
(e.g., Zambian Watchdog, 2013) and worries about identity theft are
emerging (Onwuegbuchi and Ugwu, 2013). However, the specifics of
African political and economic development matter, and future work should
draw on this history and context. By way of illustration, the outsourcing of
network monitoring to foreigners mentioned above is directly a result of
limited bureaucratic and technical acumen, and the impotence of the
resistance to SIM registration can be attributed to the political
arrangements in many African countries where civil society and opposition
is weak. Scholars studying digital technologies would do well to connect
with Africanists.
 
VII. Conclusion
While many popular and academic narratives on the impact of mobile
telephony on Africa’s development depict a positive outlook in which
technology will bring sustained benefits to citizens as connectivity
increases, parallel developments complicate these storylines. As we have
shown, SIM registration represents a form of communications surveillance
that reduces the anonymity once afforded — perhaps unintentionally — by
prepaid airtime. These identification mandates may bring modest security
benefits, although as noted, the evidence for such claims remains
inconclusive. More importantly for the present discussion, however, is that
SIM registration complicates the much–lauded developmental and
emancipatory influences of these technologies. Of course, this pessimistic
view ignores the resistance dynamics that were the focus of this article. In
the case of SIM registration, it seems formal resistance to the imposition of
the laws has been modest and ineffectual, but more everyday forms of
resistance to compliance are proliferating. And, of course, these
technologies never perform as seamlessly or perfectly as their proponents
claim (cf., Magnet, 2011). At the very least, more debate is needed about
these policies, including their political origins, effectiveness, and unintended
consequences. We hope this paper has made a small contribution to these
debates.
On the topic of future research, there is a lot of exciting work to do. We
have ambitions to conduct deeper case studies of these programs across
several countries on the continent. This will involve a closer engagement
with stakeholders as well as an ethnographic examination of the everyday
life of SIM registration, including documenting in detail what actually
transpires at the point of enrolment (e.g., how discretionary are
requirements in practice, what role does local knowledge play during
registration when, for example, the enrollee is already known by the
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enrolment agent, and so forth), as well as post–registration realities. In
addition, future research ought to explore more how African SIM
registration policies conflict with other policy initiatives. As we have
suggested above, it is already linked to the financial inclusion agenda, but
other areas remain unassessed. For example, in Mexico the VidaNET
program, which provides a treatment reminder system to those with HIV,
has faced challenges as a result of the country’s SIM registration laws.
Patients are understandably wary about participating in these mobile health
programs because they fear medical confidentiality may be jeopardized by
unrelated identity registration requirements (Feder, 2010). A separate
regulatory development that deserves further study is the crackdown on
counterfeit mobile devices, as is currently taking place in Kenya. This anti–
counterfeit phone initiative led by the Communications Commission of
Kenya and executed by MNOs aims to disconnect handsets with
unrecognized IMEI numbers, which are believed to be fake (wa Chebusiri,
2012) [26]. This disconnection strategy has been linked with the country’s
SIM registration efforts even though it is not immediately obvious how the
two relate (that is, counterfeit phones seem to represent more of a trade
regulation matter than a security problem). Finally, there is significant room
for academics and civil society to work with government on the challenges
raised in this paper for consumer protection laws, data protection laws, and
constitutional safeguards. Best practice guidance with regard to SIM
registration and network disconnection would also serve policy–makers. 
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Notes
1. Within the community, disagreements about its focus and purpose exist,
including whether or not information and communication technology and
development (ICTD) is a more accurate term. For a discussion, see Donner
(2011).
2. Lyon, 2002, p. 2.
3. Poster, 1990, p. 3.
4. As with any method, ours has particular strengths and weaknesses. This
broad and sustained effort to survey the African continent uncovered a host
of emerging effects of SIM registration that have not previously been
systematized, though this necessarily limits the contextual understanding
that would emerge from fieldwork on the ground. In future, we hope to
complement this paper through case studies of regulatory processes and
actual policy enforcement.
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5. An IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is a unique identifier
used in GSM, UTMS, and LTE networks. This information is stored on a
mobile device’s SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card and comprises a
three–digit Mobile Country Code (MCC), a two–three digit Mobile Network
Code (MNC), and a one–10 digit Mobile Subscriber Identification Number
(MSIN). At its most basic, an IMSI catcher is a technology that pretends to
be a cell site and is used to collect IMSI numbers from mobile devices
(including mobile phones and SIM–enabled tablets and other devices)
within a specific geographic area. It is used to intercept and analyze
communications between phones and the mobile network, and is normally
undetectable by mobile users. It has been reported in at least Ghana
(GhanaWeb, 2005) and sought by Liberian authorities, though U.N.
regulations may not permit it (FrontPageAfrica, 2013).
6. Given the CDMA standard does not use removable SIM cards, this survey
is of course limited to the dominant GSM standard.
7. These data were compiled from various sources, including research
conducted by MobileActive (an advocacy group), Steve Song of Village
Telco, Jentzsch’s (2012) work on the economic implications of mandatory
SIM registration, and the authors’ own data collection efforts. As of
February 2014, only Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia, Somalia
and Swaziland had not introduced a policy for SIM registration.
8. Jentzsch, 2012, pp. 610–611.
9. Jentzsch, 2012, p. 612; see also GSMA, 2012.
10. Jentzsch, 2012, p. 617.
11. Analysys Mason, 2010, pp. 41–42.
12. Hemeson, 2012, p. 4.
13. Gilliom, 2001, p. 112.
14. Indeed, much of the discourse surrounding SIM registration is
militaristic. In (post–conflict) Liberia, the local MNO has referred to SIM
registration agents as “foot soldiers” (Genoway, 2012). In Uganda, the ICT
Ministry has propagated the oft–debunked (Solove, 2011) but durable myth
that “the only person who should be afraid of SIM registration, naturally, is
the criminally–minded” (Uganda. Ministry of Information and
Communications Technology, 2012).
15. Though, see Lyon, 2002, pp. 85–86, for a reflection on this topic.
16. As the head of Vodacom South Africa noted, “Vodacom alone will have
to register 9,000 customers every single hour for a full year” in order to
meet the SIM registration requirements (Knott–Craig, 2006).
17. This has been noted explicitly in Uganda (Businge, 2012) and mirrors
similar concerns with other mandatory registration systems in Africa. For
example, the effectiveness of the South African social protection program
has been continually challenged by the barriers posed through the
identification requirement for the more than 10 million eligible beneficiaries.
Overcoming the difficulties poor people face in accessing government
channels and acquiring necessary documentation has required significant
organizational and technical innovation, such as mobile registration
programs, cross–departmental harmonization, and free provision of office
supplies.
18. The GSMA (2013a) estimates 1.98 SIM cards per subscriber in non–
BRIC developing countries, noting “SIM per subscriber patterns are
influenced by cost–conscious consumers who accumulate prepaid SIM cards
to cope with limited rural network coverage and to benefit from the latest
and most affordable tariffs”.
19. In one of the few cases where specifics are available, Telecel Zimbabwe
reported that 10,000 of the 100,000 unregistered SIM cards it shut off in
September 2013 had been active (Kabweza, 2013).
20. There are, of course, ways to minimize the exclusionary aspect. In the
UAE, unregistered SIM cards can still receive calls and SMS, though not
initiate them (Ghanim, 2013); diaspora Rwandans can register online
(Mwenesi, 2013).
21. de Koker, 2010, pp. 19–20.
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22. On a related note, the merger of South African biometric identity
documents and financial services is discussed in Breckenridge (2005) and
for Ghana in Breckenridge (2010).
23. Activists have even tracked the whereabouts of executives and sales
people of surveillance technology firms on the continent, with recent
evidence revealing, for example, business trips to Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Morocco, and Uganda (WikiLeaks, 2013).
24. Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013, p. 221.
25. For a start, see the International Principles on the Application of Human
Rights to Communications Surveillance, at
https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text.
26. In Pakistan, when one phone was reported as stolen, it shut off
thousands of other phones because the IMEI numbers had been cloned (van
der Berg, 2012, p. 42).
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